We investigate how private information and monitoring affects both the sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flows and the role of accounting quality in reducing this sensitivity. We expect financing frictions to be lower when debt is obtained from banks with private information and when banks place direct restrictions on investments. We also argue that access to private information and direct restrictions on investments are likely to affect the extent to which accounting quality reduces financing frictions. The results of our empirical analysis suggest that for financially constrained firms, banks' access to private information reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity, and the presence of this private information decreases the value of accounting quality. We further find that, for both financially constrained and unconstrained firms, covenants directly restricting capital expenditures also mitigate the negative effects of information asymmetry on investment spending. In addition, the importance of accounting quality is eliminated in the presence of covenants that directly restrict capital expenditures. Our results suggest that when information asymmetry problems are likely to be the largest, accounting quality is most important. However, if outside suppliers of capital use contractual restrictions on investment, or have access to private information, then accounting quality is less important. We also provide evidence that banks' access to private information reduces the cash flow sensitivity of cash and mitigates the importance of accounting quality in reducing this sensitivity. This additional evidence suggests that our investment-cash flow sensitivity results are not driven by mismeasurement of the investment opportunity set.
Introduction
Information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital can affect firms' financing decisions and capital investments (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . A growing body of evidence indicates that firms can reduce information asymmetry costs by committing to improved accounting quality. One implication of this research is that higher accounting quality may reduce financing frictions. Consistent with this possibility, Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Verdi (2006) document that higher accounting quality reduces the sensitivity of firms' investment to their internally generated cash flows.
Alternatively, investment inefficiency caused by information asymmetry can be reduced by outside suppliers of capital, such as banks, who can obtain information through private channels or directly monitor managers through covenants that restrict managerial actions once capital has been supplied. If the outside supplier of capital accesses private information, or controls managerial actions, then accounting quality is likely to have less influence on the efficiency of firms' investments.
Consistent with this idea, Biddle and Hilary (2006) examine the influence of accounting quality on investment efficiency across countries. They find that accounting quality influences investment efficiency in the U.S. but not in Japan, and suggest that the difference in the mix of debt and equity in firms' capital structures across these two countries is one potential explanation of this cross-country difference.
We add to this research by providing a more direct test of how the source of financing affects the influence of accounting quality on firms' investment-cash flow sensitivity. Although we want to investigate the lenders' ability to obtain private information and monitor borrowers after the capital is supplied, directly testing the influence of debt financing on the role of accounting quality on the investment-cash flow sensitivity is challenging because this relation could be affected by the firm's ability to obtain financing. To control for this effect, we restrict our sample to firms that have all recently obtained debt financing and exploit the continuum of lending suggested by Diamond (1991) to examine how cross-sectional differences in lenders' access to private information and monitoring affects the importance of accounting quality on firms' investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Specifically, Diamond (1991) suggests that at one end of the lending spectrum is private bank debt, where the lender has the greatest access to private information and is more likely to take an active role monitoring the borrower. At the other end is public debt, where lenders have the least access to private information and perform very little monitoring. Diamond's (1991) model suggests that accounting quality is likely to serve a more important role in firms that borrow from the public debt market than in those that borrow from banks.
We investigate how private information and monitoring affect both the sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flows and the role of accounting quality in reducing this sensitivity by comparing the investment-cash flow sensitivity for a sample of 1,222 firms that the Securities Datacorp (SDC) indicates have recently raised capital through the issuance of either public debt or through the issuance of syndicated bank debt. By only examining firms that have recently obtained debt financing we are attempting to hold constant the firm characteristics associated with this financing decision. However, firms that obtain public debt are likely to differ from those that obtain bank debt. We therefore use an endogenous switching model to mitigate any sample selection bias induced by this comparison.
We hypothesize that there are four factors likely to affect the investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms obtaining debt financing. First we consider whether the difference in access to private information due to the source of financing affects financing frictions. Diamond's (1991) model suggests that some lenders, such as banks, have greater access to private information than other lenders, like public bondholders. If a bank's information advantage reduces information asymmetry, then we expect the sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flows to be smaller for firms that obtain bank debt than for those that obtain public debt.
Second, we consider whether the source of financing influences the role of accounting quality in reducing financing frictions. Biddle and Hilary (2006) find that accounting quality influences the sensitivity of investment to cash flows in equity dominated economies (the U.S), but not in debt dominated economies (Japan). They suggest that equity holders are more likely to rely on public signals, like accounting quality, to reduce information asymmetry, while debt holders are more likely to rely on private information. Diamond's (1991) model suggests that these results may not hold for all types of debt. Some debt holders, like those holding public debt, do not have direct access to private information, and thus will rely more on public information to reduce information asymmetry. Banks, which have greater access to private information, are less likely to rely on accounting quality as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry.
Third, we expect the sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flows to depend on whether lenders contractually restrict investment. We expect contractual restrictions that prevent managers from making opportunistic investments will not only reduce firms' investments but will also reduce the sensitivity of their investments to internally generated cash flows.
Finally, we predict that when firms face contractual restrictions on investments, information problems are partially addressed and accounting quality becomes less valuable, and thereby accounting quality is less likely to affect the sensitivity of investments to internally generated cash flows.
We acknowledge that the sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flows may be lower immediately after obtaining debt financing. However, this possibility would bias against rejecting our hypotheses. We also consider the possibility that the investment-cash flow sensitivity captures information not only about financing frictions but also about firms' investment opportunities. To address this concern, we examine the effect of these four factors on investment-cash flow sensitivities for financial constrained firms versus unconstrained firms.
We, ex ante, define financial constrained firms based on the Whited and Wu (2004) index. Whited and Wu (2004) state that financially constrained firms act as if they have high discount rates, which is likely to cause these firms to rely on internally generated cash flows. We expect that the investments of financially constrained firms, who have greater information asymmetry problems, will depend more on internally generated funds. Similarly, investment-cash flow sensitivities will depend more on the quality of accounting information, the existence of private information and contractual investment restrictions for financially constrained firms.
Finally, we also adopt an alternative approach, suggested by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , to address the concern that growth opportunities are being captured in our cash flow measures and thus affect the relationship between cash flows and investments. They suggest that replacing investment with changes in cash holdings will reduce the influence of the investment opportunity set. That is the sensitivity of changes in the cash balance to cash flows from operations is less subject to concerns about cash flows measuring investment opportunities since, in the absence of financing frictions, the change in the cash balance should not be correlated with investment opportunities.
To provide evidence on our hypotheses, we begin by estimating an ordinary least squares regression of investment on internally generated cash flows. We then interact the cash flow variable with five different measures of accounting quality, a dichotomous variable measuring whether the firm obtains bank debt financing, and a measure of investment restrictions. We also interact the product of the cash flow variable and accounting quality variables with the bank debt financing and investment restrictions variables.
Next we estimate an endogenous switching model to mitigate any sample selection bias induced by differences between firms that obtain public debt from those that obtain bank debt. Then we partition the sample into firms that are more versus less likely to face financing constraints and investigate the determinants of the investmentcash flow sensitivities across this partition. We conclude our analysis by examining how the coefficient on cash flows varies with accounting quality and bank financing in a balance sheet liquidity model. Consistent with prior literature, we find that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is lower for firms with higher accounting quality measured using four different proxies and one combined proxy based on either ordinary least squares or endogenous switching estimation. When we split the sample into firms that are more versus less likely to be financially constrained, we find that accounting quality reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity for the firms more likely to face financial constraints, but has no effect for those less likely to face such constraints. This implies that accounting quality is likely to be most important for firms that have the largest information asymmetry problems. We also find that the cash-cash flow sensitivity is lower for firms with higher accounting quality. Together these results provide reassurance that the accounting quality results are not merely due to a potential correlation between cash flows and firms' investment opportunity sets.
Consistent with Diamond (1991) , we find that the type of lender providing capital affects the investment-cash flow sensitivity. The sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flows is lower in financially constrained firms that have banks as lenders.
Thus access to private information appears to be important when information asymmetry problems are likely to be high. Consistent with private information and accounting quality being substitutes, we find that the importance of accounting quality is lower in the presence of private information (again for financially constrained firms). We also find that the cash-cash flow sensitivity is lower for firms obtaining bank financing and that the importance of accounting quality is lower for those firms.
Finally, we find that banks' monitoring role via contractual restrictions on investment reduces the sensitivity of investment to cash flows regardless of the likelihood of financial constraints. Investment restrictions also appear to reduce the importance of accounting quality.
Jointly, the results of our paper confirm the importance of accounting quality in mitigating the negative effects of information asymmetry on the sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flows. Previous research by Verdi (2006) and Biddle and Hillary (2006) finds that, on average, firms that have higher quality accounting information are less likely to rely on internally generated funds for investment. Our paper expands our understanding of the importance of accounting information by identifying the contexts in which the quality of the firm's accounting information is likely to be important. When information asymmetry problems are likely to be the largest accounting quality is more important. However, if outside suppliers of capital impose contractual restrictions on investment, or have access to private information, then accounting quality is less important. Furthermore, our finding that accounting quality reduces the sensitivity of balance sheet liquidity to cash flows and that the importance of accounting quality decreases in the face of bank loans suggests that our results based on investment-cash flow sensitivity are not merely due to cash flows capturing firms' investment opportunity sets.
Section 2 provides background for our study. We discuss our hypothesis development in Section 3. We describe our sample in Section 4 and our research design in Section 5. We discuss our empirical results in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
Background

Related Research
Several recent papers have examined the effect of accounting quality on firms' investments. These studies take a variety of approaches to examining this issue. Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005) are specifically interested in whether firms promptly withdraw capital from losing projects. They investigate whether firms in countries with accounting regimes characterized by more timely accounting recognition of economic losses respond more quickly to declining investment opportunities by reducing net inflows of capital to new investments. They conclude that their results support this hypothesis and suggest that this effect is stronger in countries with more diffuse ownership.
Verdi (2006) is concerned not only with whether firms over-invest in losing projects but also with whether they under-invest in positive net-present-value projects.
His overinvestment results are similar to those in Bushman, Priotroski, and Smith (2005) in that he finds that higher accounting quality mitigates this problem and that the effect is greater for firms with dispersed ownership. However, he states that he "cannot conclude that financial reporting quality is associated with lower underinvestment due to the reduction in information asymmetry between the firm and investors." Biddle and Hilary (2006) examine how accounting quality affects firms' investment-cash flow sensitivity. They find that higher accounting quality is associated with lower investment-cash flow sensitivity in the U.S. but not in Japan. They argue that the difference in results across these two countries is driven by the fact that more capital in the U.S. is provided through arm's-length transactions with investors who do not have access to private information channels. They do not directly test this interpretation.
Furthermore, as they acknowledge, even if these results are driven by differences in access to private information across these two countries, their tests do not distinguish between lenders' ability to obtain private information versus their ability to monitor managers once capital is supplied.
Thus the existing research on the effects of accounting quality on investments concludes that accounting quality improves investment efficiency, but the improvements are predominantly in firms with diffuse ownership where equity is likely to be the source of capital. Given the results in Bharath et al. (2006) , Francis et al. (2005) , and Whittenberg-Moerman (2006) that firms with relatively higher accounting quality are rewarded with a reduction in the cost-of-debt, it is somewhat surprising that this lower cost of capital would not lead to improved investment efficiency.
The central argument underlying these papers is that improved accounting quality allows lenders to reduce the costs associated with information asymmetry suggesting that accounting quality should increase investment efficiency even for firms that rely on debt financing. In this paper we attempt to reconcile these results by looking at the contexts in which accounting quality is likely to be the most important in the U.S. debt markets. We also attempt to distinguish between the effects of lenders' private information versus monitoring on the role accounting quality plays in reducing financing frictions and improving investment efficiency.
Features of U.S. Debt Markets
Diamond (1991) describes the U.S. debt market as a continuum of access to private information and monitoring. At one end of the spectrum are public debt holders, who do not have direct access to private information and engage in very little monitoring.
At the other end is private bank debt, which is characterized by lenders who have greater access to private information and by loans that contain numerous covenants. There is a large theoretical literature in banking that focuses on banks' ability to reduce information asymmetries. Empirical support for these theoretical models is provided by James' (1987) findings that banks provide cheap "informed" funds as opposed to the costly "uninformed" funds provided by public debt. Similarly, Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) find that firms with a greater degree of information asymmetry rely more on bank debt.
Previous research has also documented that the use of covenants differs for private versus public debt. For example, Billet, King, and Mauer (2004) document the use of covenants for a sample of 7,567 public bonds issued between 1995 and 2003 with bond covenant data available of the FISD database. They find that less than 5 percent of these issues included investment policy restrictions.
1 While Nini, Smith and Sufi (2006) document that the incidence of capital expenditure covenants in syndicated bank loans is much higher. They find that for their sample of 3,720 deals for which they could obtain covenant data, 32% have a capital expenditure restriction.
We exploit the difference in lenders' access to private information between public and private debt holders in the U.S. debt markets to explore how private information affects investment and how it affects the role that accounting quality plays. In addition, the prevalence of capital expenditure covenants in private debt contracts allows us to further distinguish between the importance of banks' private information and their ability to monitor the borrower.
Hypothesis Development
In the absence of information problems internally generated cash flows should not be important in investment decisions. However, in the presence of information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital, firms may face financing frictions which cause them to rely on internally generated funds to finance their investments Peterson, 1988 and . The extent to which firms rely on internally generated funds will depend on the extent of information asymmetry between managers and those providing capital.
Some providers of capital, like banks, are likely to have superior information about firms compared to other investors (like public debtholders) that have less access to private information. 2 Due to this informational advantage we expect that the extent to which internally generated cash flows are important in firms' investment decisions will be lower for firms who finance with bank debt rather than public debt. This leads to our first hypothesis.
H1:
Banks' access to private information reduces the borrowers' investment-cash flow sensitivity. Biddle and Hillary (2006) argue that banks' superior private information should serve as a substitute for accounting quality in determining the sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flows. While this prediction is consistent with theoretical models such as Holthausen and Verrecchia (1998) , recent empirical research suggests that rather than acting as substitutes, private information and public information may act as complements. For example, Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2002) find a positive association between the market reaction to analysts' reports and quarterly earnings announcement. Similarly, Chen, Cheng and Lo (2006) argue that private and public information sources can complement one another if the public information contains complex data that is made more informative after additional explanation and interpretation. Given the conflicting predictions from the theoretical versus empirical work we expect that access to private information and accounting quality could serve either as substitutes or as complements in determining the sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flows. Our second hypothesis is:
For firms with bank debt, the effect of higher quality accounting on the investment-cash flow sensitivity is reduced if public and private information are substitutes and is enhanced if these two sources of information are complements.
In addition, banks often include explicit covenants in their debt agreements to limit managers' opportunistic investments. These covenants provide banks with an alternative mechanism to mitigate the problems associated with information asymmetry.
If covenants explicitly limiting investments mitigate information problems, then they should reduce the importance of internally generated cash flows on firms' investment decisions. Our third hypothesis is:
The existence of an investment covenant reduces borrowers' investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Based on the assumption that the use of covenants restricting investment activities provides a substitute mechanism for addressing information problems, we expect that the importance of accounting quality in reducing the importance of internally generated cash flows on the investment decision to be mitigated in the presence of such a covenant. (The opposite prediction would hold if this type of covenant and accounting quality are complements rather than substitutes.) Our fourth hypothesis is:
The effect of higher quality accounting on the investment-cash flow sensitivity is mitigated by the existence of an investment covenant.
Sample Characteristics
Sample Selection
We test our hypotheses using a sample of firms that are listed in the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) database as having issued public debt or entered into a syndicated loan. We identified 2,251 firms (8,930 firm years) that had either a public debt issuance or syndicated loan issuance between fiscal year 2000 and 2005. Of these 2,251
firms (8,930 firm years) we noted that 886 firms (3,994 firm years) had a public debt issuance, 1836 firms (6,597 firm years) had a private debt (syndicated loan) issuance, and 471 firms (2,223 firm years) had both public and private debt issuances.
When we merge this data with COMPUSTAT, we noted that 1,209 firms (4,241) firm years) were missing data necessary to test our hypotheses. This data restriction resulted in a final sample of 1,222 firms (4,689 firm years). Our final sample consists of 1,034 firms (3,575 firm-years) that have private debt outstanding, 505 firms (2,201 firm years) that have public debt outstanding and 317 firms (1,087 firm years) that have both private and public debt outstanding. Within the final private debt sample, 384 firms
(1,175 firm years) are associated with the use of covenants that restrict investments representing 37.1% (32.9%) of all firms (firm-years). These percentages are close to those of Nini et al. (2006) .
Proxy Development
Testing our hypotheses requires measures of investment, cash flows, accounting quality, access to private information, investment restrictions, financial constraints and control variables.
Consistent with existing research, we measure the extent of the firm's investing activities, Investment, as the total capital expenditures of the firm (COMPUSTAT data item 128) and measure cash flows, CFO, as the cash flows from operations (COMPUSTAT data item 308). We scale both variables by the firm's average total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6).
Given a lack of consensus about the best way to measure accounting quality we use several different measures and a composite measure to enhance the validity of our results. Our first accounting quality measure, AQ1, is based on Dechow and Dichev (2002) . This measure captures the extent to which accruals map into cash flows. For each firm in the sample we run a time-series regression of total current accruals on cash flows from operations measured concurrently and with a one period lead and one period lag.
The variable AQ1 is measured as the Adjusted R-squared from these regressions (this measure is consistent with the measure used in Biddle and Hilary (2006) ). Following
Wysocki (2005), our second measure of earnings quality is a measure of the persistence of the firm's earnings. For each firm in our sample we run a time-series regression of one period ahead earnings on current earnings. The variable AQ2 is measured as the coefficient on current earnings from this regression.
Our third measure of earnings quality, AQ3, capturing earnings predicatbility is measured as the Adjusted R-squared from our earnings persistence model. Our fourth measure, AQ4, captures cash flow predictability. It is measured as the Adjusted R-squared from a regression of one year ahead cash flow on current earnings. Our composite measure, All-Rank, is the average of the ranks of each of these four individual measures. All of our accounting quality measures are estimated on a firm-specific basis using 10 years of data including the investment year. 4 When estimating the regression we require at least 8 years of observations.
To measure the effects of private information on the relationship between investment and cash flows we create the variable Bank. Bank is a dichotomous variable that is set equal to one if the firm has outstanding bank debt during our sample period, otherwise it is zero. To measure the effects of investment restrictions on the relationship between investment and cash flows we create the variable Inv_Cov. Inv_Cov is also a dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm has a covenant in their debt contract that restricts investment during our sample period, otherwise it is zero. We measure financing constraint using the index developed by Whited and Wu (2004) , discussed below.
In addition to our test variables, we also include control variable for other factors that are likely to affect the firm's investment choices. 5 More specifically, we control for the firm's growth options in place by including the variable TobinsQ, which is calculated as the book value of total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6) plus market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 199 * COMPUSTAT data item 25) minus book value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 60) and deferred tax (COMPUSTAT item 74) divided by the book value of total assets.
We control for firm size by including the variable Size, which is measured as the natural log of the firm's total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6). We also control for risk by including the variable Credit Rate, which is a categorical measure ranging from 1-4.
For firms with rated debt we use the debt rating and classify the firms as a one if their ratings are between D and B+, we classify them as a 2 if their ratings are between BBand BB+, as a 3 if their ratings are between BBB-and BBB+ and finally we classify them as a 4 if their ratings are between A-and AAA. For firms without rated debt we follow the procedure outlined in Barth et al (2006) to develop a credit rating. That is, for the entire sample of firms on COMPUSTAT over our time period we estimate annual cross-sectional regression of the firm's debt rating on a set of financial variables (total assets, ROA, debt to assets, dividend indicator, subordinated debt indicator, and a loss indicator). We use the parameters from this regression and the firm's financial information to predict a credit rating for each firm year for those that do not have a credit rating.
Finally, we also control for the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure and the financial slack the firm has to meet their investment needs by including the variables Leverage and Slack in the regression. Leverage is a measured as long-term debt (COMPUSTAT data item 9) divided by the sum of long-term debt and market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 199 * COMPUSTAT data item 25). Slack is measured as cash and cash equivalent (COMPUSTAT data item1) divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6). We also noted that firms that have private debt are smaller, less levered, have lower credit rating, and less cash holding.
Descriptive Statistics
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 provide means for our test and control variables for sample firms partitioned by whether they have private debt that contains an investment restriction versus private debt that does not have an investment restriction. 6 Unlike the public/private debt partition, here we do find significant differences in accounting quality for three of our five measures of accounting quality. More specifically, we find that firms that issue private debt without investment restrictions have more persistent earnings (AQ2), have a higher Adjusted R-squared in a regression of earnings on lagged earnings (AQ3), and our measure combining the ranks of all four accounting measures (All-Rank)
is also larger, suggesting that firms that have investment restrictions in their contracts have lower accounting quality. We also find that firms that have investment restrictions in their debt contracts spend less money on capital expenditures (Investment) after they enter into the debt contract. They also have lower cash flow from operations (CFO).
However, we find no difference in the change in cash (ΔCash) across these two groups of firms. In addition, we find that firms with investment restrictions have lower TobinsQ, smaller size, lower credit rating, higher leverage and higher cash holdings. 6 We examined the use of investment restrictions in public debt using the covenant data in both the SDC and Mergent databases. None of the debt in the SDC database listed specific investment restrictions covenants. Less than 5% of the public debt in the Mergent database had an investment covenant restriction. Jointly, these databases suggest that the vast majority of public debt issuances do not restrict investment. TobinsQ, but is also positively and significantly correlated with operating cash flows.
We also note that TobinsQ and cash from operations are positively correlated. Further, we find that change in cash is positively and significantly related to cash from operations, but, consistent with the arguments made by Almeida et al. (2004) , change in cash is not significantly correlated with TobinsQ.
Research Design
Investment Model
To test our hypotheses we estimate the following investment model using all firm years with available data between the debt issuance and maturity dates: Investment = α + β 1 AQ+ β 2 Bank + β 3 Inv_Cov + β 4 CFO + β 5 CFO*Bank + β 6 CFO*Inv_Cov + β 7 CFO*AQ + β 8 CFO*AQ*Bank + β 9 CFO*AQ*Inv_Cov + β 10 Tobins Q + β 11 Size + β 12 Credit Rate + β 13 Leverage + β 14 Slack + ε Variable Definitions: Investment: Measured as the firm's total capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT data item 128) divided by total average assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6).
Bank:
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm has outstanding bank debt financing, zero otherwise Inv_Cov:
An indicator variable equal to one when the bank loan contains a covenant restricting capital investment, zero otherwise CFO:
Measured as cash flow from operations (COMPUSTAT data item 308) divided by average total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6).
AQ:
One of five measures of accounting quality AQ1:
Measured as the Adjusted R-squared from estimating a regression of total current accruals on cash flows from operations measured concurrently and with a one period lead and one period lag (Dechow and Dichev (2002)). When estimating the regression we require at least 8 years of observations from the past 10 years, including the investment year.
AQ2:
A measure of earnings persistence derived by regressing one period ahead earnings on current earnings. When estimating the regression we require at least 8 years of observations from the past 10 years, including the investment year. We use the coefficient on current earnings as our measure of earnings persistence.
AQ3:
Measured as the Adjusted R-squared from the earnings persistence model discussed in AQ2.
AQ4:
Measured as the Adjusted R squared from a regression of one year ahead cash flow on current earnings. When estimating the regression we require at least 8 years of observations from the past 10 years, including the investment year.
All-Rank:
Measured as the average of the rankings (percentiles) among all firm-years of the above 4 measures.
TobinsQ:
Measured as the book value of total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6) plus market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 199 * COMPUSTAT data item 25) minus book value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 60) and deferred tax (COMPUSTAT item 74) divided by the book value of total assets.
Size:
Measured as the log of total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6). Credit Rate: Measured using a categorical variable that ranges from 1-4. For firms with rated debt the variable is 1 if the rating is between D and B+, 2 if their rating is between BB-and BB+, as a 3 if their rating is between BBB-and BBB+ and finally we classify them as a 4 if their rating is between A-and AAA. For firms without rated debt we follow the procedure outlined in Barth et al (2006) to develop a credit rating that falls within this 1-4 scale.
Leverage:
Measured as long-term debt (COMPUSTAT data item 9) divided by the sum of long-term debt and market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 199 * COMPUSTAT data item 25.) Slack:
Measured as cash and cash equivalent (COMPUSTAT data item 1) divided by the total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6).
If firms' investments are sensitive to their internally generated cash flows then we would expect a positive coefficient on the CFO variable. Higher accounting quality should reduce the information problems that lead to the investment-cash-flow sensitivity, so the coefficient on CFO*AQ will be negative. Consistent with hypothesis 1, if banks have superior private information and private information reduces the effect of information asymmetry on investment cash flow sensitivity then we expect the coefficient on CFO*Bank to be negative. Given that public and private information could be either complements or substitutes, hypothesis 2 suggests that the coefficient on CFO*AQ*Bank could be either positive or negative. Hypothesis 3 suggests that the existence of an explicit restriction on the borrowers' capital investment should result in a negative coefficient on CFO*Inv_Cov. The existence of an explicit restriction on the capital expenditures is expected to reduce the importance of information asymmetries and is therefore expected to reduce the benefits of higher accounting quality. Hypothesis 4
suggests that the coefficient on CFO*AQ*Inv_Cov should be positive.
Endogenous Switching Model
We estimate an endogenous switching model to mitigate any sample selection bias induced by differences between firms that obtain public debt from those that obtain bank debt. The first stage model is based on Denis and Mihov (2003) and Krishnaswami et al. (1999) . Denis and Mihov (2003) argue that the primary determinant of the debt source is the credit quality of the issuer, and therefore we include Credit Rate in the model. Further, Krishnaswami et al. (1999) finds the scale economies in flotation costs, proxied by Size, and moral hazards costs, proxied by TobinsQ, affect the choice of debt financing. We also include Leverage and Slack as control variables. We estimate the following first stage model of the determinants of obtaining bank debt versus public debt:
The predicted values from the estimation of this model are then incorporated into our investment model to correct for potential correlation in the errors of this model for the public debt and bank debt samples. All the variables are as defined above.
Financing Constraints Index
While there is considerable debate as to whether the sensitivity of investment to firms' internally generated cash flows is uniformly a good measure of financing frictions (Fazzari et al., 2000, and Kaplan and Zingales, 2000) , there is some consensus that this measure behaves differently between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Whited and Wu (2004) state that financially constrained firms act as if they have high discount rates, which is likely to cause these firms to rely on internally generated cash flows. If the existence of financing restrictions suggests an increase in the importance of information asymmetry problems, then we would expect accounting quality, access to private information, and investment restrictions to have a greater influence on investment-cash flow sensitivity for financially constrained firms.
To provide evidence on whether financial constraints affect the relationship between investment and internally generated cash flows, we partition the sample into firms that are more versus less likely to have financial constraints using the index developed by Whited and Wu (2004) . They suggest that the extent of the firm's financing constraints is a function of the firm's leverage, sales growth, cash flow, and dividend policy. Their index is calculated as: FCIndex = -0.062*TLTD + 0.01*DIVPOS + 0.067*SG + 0.06 *SIZE -0.043* ISG + 0.053*CF
Variable Definitions: TLTD:
Measured as the firm's long term debt (COMPUSTAT data item 9) divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6). DIVPOS: An indicator that takes the value of one if the firm pays cash dividends (COMPUSTAT data item 21).
SG:
Measured by change in sales divided by lagged sales (COMPUSTAT data item 12).
SIZE:
Measured as the natural log of total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6).
ISG:
Measured as the firm's 3-digit industry sales growth.
CF:
Measured as the ratio of cash flow, measured by earnings before extraordinary (COMPUSTAT data item 123) plus depreciation (COMPUSTAT data item 14), to total assets.
For each firm in our sample, we calculate this index, and then partition the sample into two groups at the median of the distribution.
Cash Model
In addition to using the partition between financially constrained and unconstrained firms to address the concern that growth opportunities implied in cash flow measure drive the result, we also consider a different measure that captures the financing frictions. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) suggest that estimating the effect of cash flows on balance sheet liquidity provides an alternative method of detecting financing frictions. They argue that the sensitivity of changes in the cash balance to cash flows from operations is less subject to concerns about cash flows measuring investment opportunities since, in the absence of financing frictions, the change in the cash balance should not be correlated with investment opportunities. We follow Almeida et al. (2004) and estimate the following cash model using annual data for each firm year after the debt issuance until the debt matures with sufficient available data: ΔCash = α + β 1 AQ+ β 2 Bank + β 3 CFO + β 4 CFO*Bank + β 5 CFO*AQ + β 6 CFO*AQ*Bank + β 7 TobinsQ + β 8 Size + β 9 Credit Rate + β 10 Leverage +ε,
where ΔCash is the change in cash reported in the balance sheet (COMPUSTAT data item 1) scaled by lagged total asset (COMPUSTAT data item 6) and all other variables are as defined above.
Results
The results of ordinary least squares estimation of our investment model on each of our four individual measures of accounting quality, as well as our combined measure are reported in Table 3 . In all five regressions we find a significant positive coefficient on cash flow from operations (CFO) indicating that the investments of firms that issue public debt are sensitive to the amount of their internally generated cash flows. Similarly, in all five regressions we find a statistically significant negative coefficient on the CFO*AQ variable, indicating that this sensitivity is lower for firms providing higher quality accounting reports.
When we interact cash flow from operations with the dummy variable for bank loans, CFO*Bank, we find that the coefficient is insignificant in four out of our five regressions. This result suggests that a bank's access to private information does not appear to increase or decrease the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows. When we interact cash flow from operations with the investment restriction covenant variable, CFO*Inv_Cov, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient in all five regressions. This suggests that investment restrictions appear to reduce the relationship between investment and internally generated cash flows.
Similar to the main effects, we also find that CFO*AQ*Bank is insignificant in four of five regressions, suggesting that a bank's access to private information does not appear to either enhance or diminish the effect of accounting quality on internally generated cash flows. In addition, we find that CFO*AQ*Inv_Cov has a significantly positively coefficient in all regressions. This implies that investment restrictions appear to reduce the effects of accounting quality.
The results of endogenous switching estimation of our investment model on our combined accounting quality measure for public debt and private debt and the difference between these two groups are reported in Table 4 . Although we find evidence of correlation between the error terms of our lender choice model and our investment model, this correlation does not appear to change the inferences that can be drawn form OLS estimation. We continue to observe evidence of financing frictions in both the public and bank debt samples which is mitigated by accounting quality and we observe no significant difference in these effects for public versus bank debt. Table 5 reports the results of our investment model for the financially constraint partition of our sample to investigate whether the importance of banks' access to private information and the use of investment restrictions depends on whether firms face financial constraints. In contrast to the results for the whole sample, which suggest that access to private information does not affect the investment-cash flow sensitivity, the negative and significant difference between the bank and public debt coefficients on CFO for firms likely to face financing constraints indicates that banks' access to private information is important and reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms likely to have the most severe information problems.
We also find that the interaction between CFO*Inv_Cov, which is negative and statistically significant for the whole sample, remains significantly negative for both partitions of the data. These results suggest that when firms have debt that has an investment restriction, the sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flows is reduced.
We find that the difference between the bank and public debt coefficients on CFO*AQ is insignificant when we look at the entire sample, but is positive and significant in the subset of firms that are more likely to face financing constraints. This result suggests that, on average, the effect of accounting quality on the investment-cash flow sensitivity is not affected by the bank's access to private information. However, for firms with the worst information problems, access to private information reduces the importance of accounting quality on financing frictions.
We also find a positive and significant coefficient on the CFO*AQ*Inv_Cov variable for the entire sample, as well as for the group of firms that are more likely to have financing constraints. This result indicates that the importance of accounting quality in reducing the investment sensitivity is diminished in the presence of an investment covenant.
We report the results of estimating our cash model in Table 6 . The results look very similar to those from the investment model for constrained firms. Specifically, we find that cash flows increase the cash balance significantly more for firms that issue public debt than for firms that use private bank loans. We also find that the extent that cash flows lead to higher cash balances is decreasing in accounting quality for firms that issue public debt. This reduction in cash retention related to accounting quality is lower for firms using private bank loans than for firms issuing public debt.
Taken together, the results in tables 5 and 6 suggest that our investment-cash flow sensitivity results are not merely an artifact of a potential correlation between cash from operations and the investment opportunity set. In particular, this interpretation is supported by our findings that the coefficients on the interactions of cash from operations with bank debt indicator, and with accounting quality and bank debt indicator are only significant for the financial constrained firms and that they are also significant in explaining cash retention.
Sensitivity Analyses
To further ensure that our results are not just an artifact of our research design, we conduct a number of additional sensitivity analyses. First, we rerun our analyses on each measure of accounting quality, as opposed to the all-rank variable used in the prior analysis with the financial constraint partition, and the untabulated results are qualitatively similar.
Second, our analysis focuses on firm-years after the initiation of a debt contract.
We make this research design choice because it allows us to measure the lender's access to private information, and whether there are contractual restrictions on investment after the capital is provided. However, a drawback of this research design is that the firms in our sample have recently accessed the capital markets. In an untabulated sensitivity analysis, we rerun our tests in the period prior to the firm raising capital. We continue to find that accounting quality reduces the sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flows. Our variable measuring whether there is a contractual restriction on investment is insignificant in the pre-loan period. This result suggests that it is the actual restriction on investment (rather than a sample-selection bias) that reduces the sensitivity of cash flows to investment. Similarly, the interaction between accounting quality and our variable measuring the access to private information is insignificant, suggesting that it is the actual access to private information (rather than self-selection) that reduces the importance of accounting quality. Finally, our analysis uses multiple observations for each firm. Including firm fixed effects yields similar results. We also redid the analysis year-by-year. We noted that as we move out over the life of the contract, the results generally get stronger. This result is not surprising, as in the first year or two after raising external capital, firms are less likely to rely on internal cash flows for investment.
Conclusions
Previous research has demonstrated that higher accounting quality reduces the sensitivity of firms' investments to internally generated cash flows. Biddle and Hilary (2006) find that this relation exists in the U.S. but not in Japan and they conclude that accounting quality only affects investment efficiency when capital is provided through arm's-length transactions by investors that do not have access to private information.
Our paper extends this research, examining the factors within the debt market that enhance or diminish the importance of accounting information in reducing financing frictions. We examine a sample of U.S. firms that have recently raised debt financing and investigate the role of private information and monitoring on the sensitivity of investment to internally generated cash flows. We find that accounting quality affects investment-cash flow sensitivities for firms that obtain debt financing. This result is inconsistent with the results in Biddle and Hilary (2006) . We also find that investment restrictions not only reduce the sensitivity of investments to cash flows but also reduce the influence of accounting quality on the investment-cash flow sensitivity. In addition,
we find that for firms with high financial constraints, lenders' private information also reduces the effects of financing frictions and mitigates the role of accounting quality in reducing the investment-cash flow sensitivity.
We find that our results hold even when we allow for the possibility that cash flows not only capture firms' reliance on internally generated funds, but may also capture information about firms' investment opportunities. Specifically we find that for firms facing financing constraints, where information asymmetry problems are likely to be the largest, accounting quality is most important. Furthermore, we find that our results hold when we examine the cash flow sensitivity of balance sheet liquidity.
This paper extends the financial economics literature that discusses the relation between financial frictions and investment decisions. Our findings suggest that the source of financing affects investment decisions. This paper further distinguishes the informational and monitoring roles played by banks in reducing financing frictions. We provide evidence that while accounting information reduces financing frictions, the effects are mitigated when creditors' have access to private information and engage in direct monitoring, in particular for firms with financial constraints. These results are interesting because they help us understand the implications of different forms of debt financing in investment decisions and their interactions with accounting information. ++ Public Debt sample only includes firm-years that do not have outstanding bank loans ***Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level
Variable Definitions:
Investment: Measured as the firm's total capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT data item 128) divided by total average assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6).
Bank:
AQ:
AQ2:
AQ3:
AQ4:
All-Rank:
Measured as the average of the rankings of the above 4 AQ measures.
TobinsQ:
Size:
Leverage:
ΔCash
Measured as the change in cash and cash equivalents (COMPUSTAT data item 1) divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6). Variable Definitions: Investment: Measured as the firm's total capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT data item 128) divided by total average assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6).
Bank:
An indicator variable equal to one when the bank loan contains a covenant restricting capital investment, zero otherwise 35
CFO:
AQ:
AQ2:
AQ3:
AQ4:
All-Rank:
TobinsQ:
Size:
Leverage:
ΔCash
Measured as the change in cash and cash equivalents (COMPUSTAT data item 1) divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6). 
Bank:
AQ:
AQ2:
AQ3:
AQ4:
All-Rank:
TobinsQ:
Size:
Leverage:
Measured as cash and cash equivalent (COMPUSTAT data item 1) divided by the total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6). Measured as cash flow from operations (COMPUSTAT data item 308) divided by average total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6).
AQ:
Measured as the average of the rankings of AQ1, AQ2, AQ3 and AQ4. TobinsQ:
Size:
Leverage:
Measured as cash and cash equivalent (COMPUSTAT data item 1) divided by the total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6). 
Lambda
Bank:
AQ:
Size:
Leverage:
Measured as cash and cash equivalent (COMPUSTAT data item 1) divided by the total assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6). ++ Public Debt sample only includes firm-years that do not have outstanding bank loans ***Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level *Significant at the 10% level
Lambda
Variable Definitions:
Bank:
AQ:
Size:
Leverage:
Measured as long-term debt (COMPUSTAT data item 9) divided by the sum of long-term debt and market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 199 * COMPUSTAT data item 25.) 
Lambda
